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Institutional Fixes versus
Fixed Institutions
Robert Hockettt
Comment on Richard Miller's Global Institutional Reform and
Global Social Movements: From False Promise to Realistic Hope
Okay. It looks as though much, though not all, of what I have to say is
either going to reinforce or to complement what Dick Arneson has just
said. So I'll try to be (uncharacteristically) brief. I'll also place most of my
emphasis on those points that complement, rather than those that simply
reinforce, Dick's helpful remarks.
The first point I'll make is preliminary in character. It is that Professor
Miller's paper does, I believe, constitute a helpful reminder to us all. We do
well always to bear in mind that simply more international institutions, or
institutions simply with more nominal authority, will not of themselves suf-
fice to better the world. Much more is needed, and it is grossly to oversim-
plify to think or claim otherwise. It can, moreover, be positively harmful, in
a variety of ways, to fixate uniquely upon institutional solutions to all per-
ceived global problems. There is no such "fix." For we must, at a mini-
mum, bear in mind the critical roles played by what Professor Miller calls
"social movements", in addition to the roles played by institutions. So two
cheers - at the least - for what Dick Miller has just argued.
But now, on the other hand, I think that it is also critical - and I want
to emphasize that I don't take Professor Miller to be claiming the contrary,
I'm simply ensuring that no one takes him for doing so - that, for symmet-
rical reasons, we must not advocate a global social movement "fix" either.
We do best, as Dick Arneson has suggested, to consider in tandem what I
shall emphasize are the mutually complementary roles played by both insti-
tutions and movements. Indeed, in this connection I think that we might
even extend a bit from what Dick Arneson has said: We do well to consider
what seems in fact to be a cluster of essential relations between movements
and institutions. The two things are deeply connected. Indeed there is
even a sense in which we might think of movements and institutions nearly
in the way that we think of left and right, up and down, or perhaps yet
more aptly, means and ends. I think in fact that we can understand these
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things fully and accurately only when we understand them in relation to
one another. Let me draw out that prospect a bit.
There are at least two interlinked senses, I believe, in which there is
deep complementarity or symbiosis between movements and institutions.
First, an institution can usefully be viewed as a more thoroughly and
enduringly organized, rationalized, or routinized form or outcome of a
movement itself. Movements are typically geared towards, and indeed teleo-
logically best understood partly by reference to, institutional outcomes:
They aim at the creation of institutions, or the reform of institutions, or at
the development of various arrangements which effectively amount to one
or another form of "harder" or "softer" institution, or even at gradually
themselves morphing into institutions.
A brief thought-experiment, I believe, will preliminarily corroborate
my claim: Try to imagine any cluster of purposive actions taken by any
group of people in respect of some policy or set of policies - i.e., try to
imagine anything that you would count as a "movement" - that cannot be
said to be animated by and indeed even self-understood in significant part
by reference to one or more of the aims I have listed in the foregoing para-
graph. My guess is that you'll come up empty. My guess is you wouldn't
call it a "movement" were it not to be institution-connected in one or more
of those ways I've just listed.
Now turn from preliminary thought-experimentation to the dynamics
of particular institutions and movements. In the interest of time, I'll con-
fine myself here to a straightforward domestic example from the large set of
actual movements of times past and resultant institutions of times present.
So consider, if you will, the history of the American labor movement - a
movement whose history is particularly instructive, I think, for our confer-
ence's purposes. For our next panel, as you know, will concern itself with
the task of describing and prescribing in relation to the now rapidly chang-
ing global labor regime and its justice significance.
So, in the domestic case, say we're in early to mid-nineteenth century
America. Cities are crowding with new immigrants. Presently available
land is all owned. Livings can be had for the most part only by laboring for
firms owned by comparatively few others. Working conditions, in conse-
quence, are growing quite harsh for the many who don't own.
In response to these developments, first there is a gradually growing
discontent, then mounting dissent, among working folk. They feel that
something's gone wrong. They sense that somehow they're being exploited
or unjustly done-by. Or perhaps they know only that they are miserable.
At length these people begin to talk to one another about the men-
tioned developments. They commiserate and share complaints with each
other, informally at first and then maybe in somewhat more regularized or
even quasi-formal "gripe sessions." Over time they begin gradually to con-
verge upon a common set of such complaints, a common manner of
describing and framing them, perhaps even a common way of articulating
what is wrong and of diagnosing what accounts for it. In effect, these peo-
Vol. 39
2006 Institutional Fixes versus Fixed Institutions
ple have begun jointly to theorize their experiences, and to systematize
thought as to what they might rightfully do to improve their own lots.
Little by little, then, these people begin to think, then to "move," in
common. A shared set of concerns and shared language have that effect,
after all: They order experience, they regularize things. So our laborers
come gradually to constitute "a movement" - "the labor movement." But
this means that they coalesce into a kind of institution or proto-institution,
does it not? At first an institution is but the loose sense in which a lan-
guage, or an ideology, can be said to be an institution. A shared system of
interpretation of objective circumstances. But then, gradually, an institu-
tion in the "harder" sense, pursuant to which distinct responsibilities are
allocated to distinct individuals who combine efforts in pursuit of a shared
set of objectives.
The movement gradually takes the form of "labor unions," i.e., "hard"
institutions, which provide the movement with focus and stable direction,
via more or less stable "agendas" (not to mention mobilized resources), and
in so doing prevent efforts from being dissipated, wasted, unfocused and
thus ineffectual. Indeed, these unions then come to be seen almost as ends
in themselves, or at any rate as indispensable intermediate ends - means to
the ultimate end of improving labor's lot. Hence the emphasis in labor
unions on the importance of union, unity, and solidarity itself. One can
indeed view an institution as an incorporation - an embodiment - of pre-
cisely such solidarity. It is the forging of one out of many - a case of e
pluribus unum.
Now the reasons that "the labor movement" gradually took on a more
"hard" institutional form, I think, include among them (though I don't
think they're exhausted by) all the reasons that Dick Miller himself has
pointed out in defining what an institution is. All of the advantages that
Professor Miller notes institutions possess, are among what I think to be
the larger, more plenary, set of reasons that movements like the labor move-
ment tend to coalesce over time into institutions. But the full set of reasons
also includes additional explanations rooted in the essential structure - the
"group-teleology," so to speak - of collective-ends-pursuit itself, as just sug-
gested in my quaint domestic example. One might accordingly quibble a
bit with Dick's characterization of institutions - his proffered account of
institutions and their nature. I don't wish to make much of that here, how-
ever, for I don't believe that Dick meant his characterization of institutions
to be exhaustive. And my present point in any event is no more than that
the dynamic pursuant to which diffuse concerned persons coalesce into
movements is the same dynamic pursuant to which movements, in turn,
coalesce into institutions. Yet, I do believe that the fact of that dynamic's
full sweep - the fact that institutions are the consummations of movements
- can be obscured if we do not bear in mind some of the subtler characteris-
tics of institutions, the progressive stages of institutional development, and
the many subtle ways in which institutional forms vary over time and
across purposes.
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I won't belabor this point, but note: There really is a continuum of insti-
tution-types, is there not, moving from the "softer" to the "harder"? In the
terms of my labor movement story, for example, the institutional contin-
uum runs from, at the "soft" end, occasionally shared gripes by commiser-
ating laborers, to more regular "gripe sessions" by the same, to
spontaneous acts of protest by laborers acting in concert with one another,
to carefully planned protests, to fuller agenda formation, to a "labor move-
ment" whose internal "division of labor" gradually develops along more
specialized lines, and finally to full-blown, institutionalized labor unions
with elected leaders and treasuries and office space, etc. But if this is the
case, then movements and institutions do not seem to be alternatives so
much as they are looser or tighter versions of what at bottom is one thing,
with the institution being the endpoint toward which movements "move."
One more example might be more familiar to those of us who weren't
around during the heyday of the American labor movement: Think of
MoveOn.Org, whose very name could scarcely be more felicitous for pre-
sent purposes. Now if I recall correctly, MoveOn began as a spontaneous,
web-based protest against the childish public obsession with President
Clinton's private life, as cynically fomented and exploited by Clinton's
right-wing enemies whose own private lives were no cleaner than Clinton's.
It was a grassroots "movement." If you visit the MoveOn website now, how-
ever, I think you will find that, though still voluntaristic and grass-rootsy in
nature, it's a rather different - a much "tighter" and better developed -
organization than it began as. It's now a full-blown "institution" by any-
body's - even Dick Miller's for present purposes minimalist - reckoning.
And I think it is altogether natural that it would have become such, pursu-
ant precisely to the natural dynamic that I've briefly sketched above.
Indeed, had it not done so, it likely would not be around any longer, would
it?
All right, so that is the first sense in which I think movements must be
understood by reference to institutions. Call it the "institutional contin-
uum" argument - that movements are themselves proto-institutions in the
process of an evolution into full-blown institutions.
The second sense in which movements must be understood by refer-
ence to institutions is less "ontological" and more "epistemological" in
nature, at least initially. (I'll explain in a moment how this point morphs
back into the first.) What I have in mind here is that an institution - in this
case, a pre-existing, typically already "hard" institution - often provides or
even constitutes a sort of a "focal point," or at the very least an "issue-
definer" or issue-sharpener, hence a kind of galvanizer, for a social move-
ment. It provides the movement with its raison d'etre or raisons d'etre, so to
speak. We can in fact even combine this point with the first one, discussed
above, and say that movements often move either to become institutions or
to oppose institutions, perhaps even to becoming institutions in order to
oppose institutions. In all such cases, of course, the movement must be
understood by reference to (one or more) institutions. Again a familiar
example or two will make plain what I mean here.
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So, imagine, say, that on the one hand you've got a spontaneous out-
break of protest in Seattle in connection with a WTO meeting, or with an
annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank staffs in Washington. Things
begin with picketing, or perhaps throwing rocks through store windows.
The rock-throwers do this because they're pretty certain that somehow
there is something wrong with the world, and that the World Bank, the
IMF, or the WTO has something to do with it, but they've not thought
things through very well yet. They've not worked out a fully articulated
affirmative agenda, and so they've not organized very fully. They only
react to what several conspicuous, already existent, institutions do. Yet
over time, what happens is that specific, concrete, well-defined and quite
particular "issues" begin to recur in these protests - crushing sovereign
debt or poor working conditions or environmental degradation, for exam-
ple - and these become foci of our activists' protests. Once that happens,
we have begun to move from "negative" complaint to "affirmative" advo-
cacy, hence from spontaneous protest to "movement."
Now note that the particular issues I've mentioned, which come to
define movements' affirmative agendas, quite often are themselves defined
at least in part by the very institutions that first arouse the ire of the protes-
ters. The "issues" are, for example, on the agenda for discussion at a par-
ticular round of WTO negotiations, or a particular IMF/IBRD annual
meeting, or an ad hoc meeting held at the IMF headquarters in connection
with, say, a financial crisis that has struck East Asia. The WTO places
continued labor-advocated "protectionism" on its agenda. Or the IMF
places sovereign debt on its agenda. The "movements," in response, place
labor standards or debt-relief on their agendas and demand that the WTO
and the IMF do so as well. In such cases the institution's own formulated
agendas provide the occasion for the social movements themselves that
react to those agendas to sharpen their own understandings of what they're
about, of what actuates them, of what it is that the movements' members
are ultimately concerned about and what it is that they are seeking by way
of alternative.
So institutions are not only outcomes of movements as the latter move
toward greater regularity and clarity in respect of aims and practices, as I
tried to illustrate pursuant to my first point. They are also quite often occa-
sioners, even partly definers, of those particular movements which then
become institutions themselves. They effectively produce the materials
that come to constitute the movements' goals and agendas. And the move-
ments then either become institutions themselves, as per the first point
above - the labor union and MoveOn examples - or gain places at the
"tables" set in the institutions that occasion their development in the first
place.
Were I adept in Continent-style philosophical history, I suppose I
might almost be tempted to say that there is a sort of "dialectic" at work
here: A set of interests gives rise to an institution - a mobilized set of
resources and regularized set of practices geared toward advancing those
interests. Some people are harmed by the successes or excesses of that
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institution, and so begin to react to it. They then coalesce into a movement,
which itself then crystallizes into an institution, and the latter institution
not accidentally develops into a sort of "antithesis" of the first institution.
Or the antithetical movement is brought into the first institution, with the
result that both institution and movement are changed, and so a "synthe-
sis" of interests and values is worked. Maybe old Hegel and Collingwood
were onto something.
I think we can sum up what I've been saying about the two inter-
related senses in which movements and institutions are symbiotically
related with a cute little metaphor: On the one hand, an institution can be
viewed as a kind of transition belt, or drive shaft, for the effectuation of
social movements' aims themselves. The institution is the way in which the
movement's motion - all of the energies generated by the engine - can be
translated into movement forward on the ground. On the other hand, and
yet by the same token, the structural features of the drive shaft, or the
mechanism of the institution itself, in turn constrain the design of and
indeed structure the movement itself. We are able to imagine what it is that
a movement wants - what it would move toward - only when we imagine
what institution or set of institutions would embody and effectuate those
wants. In short, then, again it would seem very clear that we cannot under-
stand, let alone build or assist, movements or institutions without consider-
ing them in tandem, as essential complements of each other.
All right, that nearly completes what I have time to say. There is of
course much more that could be said. But I'm rapidly approaching my
time limit so I'll resist the temptation to say very much more. I would like
very quickly to do one thing more before closing, however. I am a little
concerned by what I take for an undercurrent of quietism or pessimism in
Professor Miller's presentation. I doubt it's intended, but it's nonetheless
easy to feel a little demoralized, I fear, upon first having our attentions
called to the terrible stories that Dick has related in his paper. So by way of
an antidote I would like to close on a brief note of hope. I'll tell one more
story that I think will both buttress the observations I have already made,
and will occasion some institution-fixing resolve, notwithstanding Dick's
helpful reminders of how institutions have been co-opted and corrupted,
typically by the most powerful nation-states, throughout history.
So imagine, if you would, a small island territory on which there are
two classes of people, each of which is hereditarily determined and perpet-
uated: On the one hand, we find a rather small number of people who
possess horses and suits of armor and lances and so forth, or are the
spouses or children of such people. These people hold most of the land
and live in large, castle-like dwellings. They don't work save in war time.
In peace time they merely engage in intrigues or sporting contests, or fight
over land with one another, using their horses and lances. Call them the
"lords."
Now imagine that, at the same time, there is a very large number of
those we'll call "peasants" or "serfs." Serfs can do nothing to support them-
selves save work the land of the lords. There's no land they can own. There
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are no resources available to them but their capacities to labor for lords.
Now these serfs, not surprisingly, in consequence live under rather less
advantaged life conditions than do the lords. This is best evidenced by the
fact that many or most of them wish they'd been born lords, or fantasize
about being lords, while few if any lords wish that they had been born serfs
or fantasize about serf life.
Now suppose that we, with our present-day ethical commitments and
sensibilities, step into this world and look around. Not surprisingly, we're
a bit shocked. We judge that the continuation of this particular set of
social arrangements will not do - it's unjust and degrading - and we won-
der what we should do about it. Or perhaps we just ask ourselves what we
should like to see happen here were we able to vote.
Should we establish a "global island" institution, or central govern-
ment, in order to improve the prospects of the serfs by better distributing
opportunity or life chances among persons whom we believe fundamen-
tally to be ethical equals? Should we perhaps establish some such institu-
tion also in order to modulate the internecine warring of the lords, who so
often are struggling with one another for territorial jurisdiction and harm-
ing serfs in the process? Won't the most powerful of these knights resist
any attempt that we make to create a centralized government structure that
modulates their warring and better distributes life prospects over the peo-
ple who live on the island? Or won't they, if they don't resist or fail in
preventing it, commandeer the apparatus of whatever institution we succeed
in creating, in order to ensure that it actually works to advance their inter-
ests? Well, yes, of course they will.
But - and I think everything important here lies in the caveat - to
answer "yes" to the questions just posed is not to say "no" to the need of the
proposed island governance institution. Think about it: Over time the
development of various productive technologies, modes of productive
organization, and interpersonal economic relations on the "global island"
we are imagining is much more than likely to issue in one or the other (or
some mix) of the following developments: Development might lead to a
greater immiseration of the serfs, such that that they grow increasingly des-
perate and ready to do just about anything to improve their lots. Or, as
productive improvement and a gradual elevation of material living stan-
dards even among serfs occurs, the serfs will acquire the material where-
withal to develop enough sense of self, enough sense of personal dignity,
enough sense of entitlement, enough sense of rights-bearingness to grow
indignant at the difference between their life prospects and those of the
lords. Either way, they are likely to act, to move, and at some point to move
together.
Now in that connection note that in either of the two broad eventuali-
ties I've projected, the process of economic development will likely impart
upon the serfs enough understanding of how to organize themselves -
probably in part by imitating and replicating the organizational modes that
they have observed in productive enterprises - that they will now find
themselves effectively able to move together in the direction of a more just
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distribution of resources and life prospects. They'll come to look like the
labor movement as described earlier. And in all likelihood what that
means, in turn, is that they will come gradually to compete with the lords
for control of the centralized island governance institution, the desirability
of which we are considering. And that form of competition will surely be
preferable by all to outright "class war," will it not? Just as we've seen hap-
pen before.
Now I think that it's more or less obvious where I've been drawing my
fanciful picture from. I've been recapitulating, in stylized, oversimplified
form, the stories of many domestic polities-cum-economies. And the ques-
tion presently before us is: Might we have reason to expect some analogous
development on the global scale? Is there reason to suppose that the devel-
opment-cum-institutional histories of our domestic polities can, should, or
will be found replicable globally? I think that it's clear that there is. At the
very least that's where the presumption should lie. Those who are skepti-
cal of institutions as means to arrive at a more just political-cum-economic
world order owe us; at the very least, some reason to expect the global case
to differ from all of our "island" cases of the past several centuries. And if
they cannot do that - as I suspect they cannot - the next question will be,
how do we do it? How do we replicate globally the story that is so familiar
domestically? I'll close with my brief provisional answer:
I suggest that we look for global analogues to the sorts of develop-
ments that have taken place over time within the domestic jurisdictions
that now boast advanced economies and democratic polities. We should
look for and identify such analogues in the international sphere, and then
push forward at precisely those points. We should push, that is, for the
kinds of economic improvement, the kinds of organizational improvement,
and the kinds of situation-interpretive, theoretic capacity, required to
enable the "global serfs" of today to accomplish globally what the "domestic
serfs" of yesteryear accomplished in their own day and place. If I am right
about this, then what I am advocating is, per Dick Miller, a global social
movement, or a cluster of such movements. But by dint of that very fact,
then, I also am advocating, for reasons that I've been at pains to elaborate,
either new global institutions, or renewed global institutions, as well. And
that, I believe, is precisely what we ought to hope for and move for.
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